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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THE PATH TO A REMEDY THAT
HITS THE MARK
Ora FredHarris,Jr.
I. INTRODUCTION

For almost three decades, the environmental movement has occupied a
prominent position on the American political landscape.' Throughout these
many years, this movement has spawned a variety of statutes and regulations
designed to improve the quality of the air and water, to manage the disposal
and cleanup of hazardous wastes, to preserve endangered species, and to
conserve natural resources.2 The principal goal of such environmental policy
making generally has been allocational efficiency,3 namely, to allocate scarce
resources for ecological health in an efficient (cost-effective) manner for now

and in the future. In this vein, the debate has focused frequently upon whether
the cost of environmental regulation exceeds the benefits to be derived
therefrom or, stated
differently, whether the regulatory regime is truly efficient
4
or cost-effective.
Virtually ignored, however, in these discussions, has been the distributional unfairness of environmental protection because, once again, the
prevailing focus has been upon allocational efficiency norms.' This
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, PursuingEnvironmentalJustice: The Distributional
Effects of EnvironmentalProtection,87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 788 (1993) ("1970s marked the
heyday of the modem environmental era").
2. See id. at 787.
3. See id. at 842 (EPA has consistently viewed its obligation as "establishing technically
effective, and economically efficient, pollution control standards").
4. See Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race
Discrimination,41 KAN. L. REV. 271, 286 (1992) ("[e]nvironmental scholars have concerned
largely with cost-benefit theory").
5. See Richard J. Lazarus, Distributionin Environmental Justice: Is There a Middle
Ground,9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEoAL COMMENT. 481 (1994) ("[ejnvironmental law is thought to be
about allocational efficiency, not the distributional unfairness of environmental protection");
Richard J. Lazarus, Essays on Environmental Justice and the Teaching ofEnvironmental Law,
96 W. VA. L. REV. 1025 (1994) (commentator draws a dichotomy between allocational
efficiency and distributional implications of environmental protection); Gerald Torres,
EnvironmentalBurdensandDemocraticJustice,21 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 431,450 (1994) ("few
statutes-state or federal--require agency officials to consider the racial or distributional effects
of an environmental decision or action"). See also Shutkin Lord, Essays on Environmental
Law, EnvironmentalJustice, andDemocracy, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1131 (1994), where the
commentators indict the inadequacies of the existing environmental law regime, not only in
terms of its indifference to the distributional effects of environmental protection, but also its)
excessive reliance on science as a cure for our environmental ills and its underestimation of the
impact of special interest groups on environmental decisionmaking; Gerald V. Bradley, (Book
Review) Overcoming Posner,94 MICH. L. REV. 1898, 1900 (1996), where the commentator
contends that Judge Posner's economic analysis of the law is morally bankrupt for a variety of
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dismissive attitude for social justice concerns has sparked a nascent field of
environmental policy making, and it is variously described as environmental
justice, environmental equity, and environmental racism.6
The primary theoretical mooring of the environmental justice movement
is that the adverse impact of environmental hazards falls disproportionately
on poor and minority communities. 7 Several studies reflect a myriad of
environmental inequities, namely: (1) the siting of waste facilities;8 (2) the
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations;9 and (3) the structure of
environmental agencies and groups.'0 Of this litany of concerns, the siting of
waste facilities has engendered the most environmental justice litigation."
Thus, this Article will only examine environmental justice remediation in the
waste siting context. This does not diminish the importance of the other
distributional inequities spawned by our environmental laws; but it is simply
an acknowledgment of the complex and multifaceted issues in this field of

reasons, including, but not limited to, Posner's concession that "[elconomics has no theory of
distributive justice." See RicHAIW A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 23 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Colin Crawford, Strategiesfor EnvironmentalJustice: Rethinking CERCLA
Medical MonitoringLawsuits, 74 B.U. L. REV. 267, 268 n. 1 (1994) (environmental justice is
explicated as "a phrase that is aspirational, but not confrontational"). For this reason, the term
"environmental justice" will be used in this essay to characterize the distributional inequities
emanating from the current environmental regime. See alsoLinda D. Blank, Seeking Solutions
to EnvironmentalInequity: The EnvironmentalJustice Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 1109, 1120 (1994)
(refers to the issue as "the environmental civil rights movement"); David Sive, Environmental
Law 25 Years Later: Weaving & Untanglingthe Web, 38 RESOURCE L. NOTES 5, 6 (1996),
(where the commentator characterizes environmental justice or environmental equity as "one
of the most challenging problems that environmental advocates face").
7. See Vicki Been, What's FairnessGot To Do With It? EnvironmentalJustice and the
Siting ofLocally UndesirableLand Uses, 78 CORNELLL. REV. 1001, 1014 (1993) (commentator
does not dispute the existence of "significant evidence of disproportionate siting").
8. See Donald E. Lively, The DiminishingRelevance ofRights: RacialDisparitiesin the
Distributionof Lead Exposure Risks, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 309, 311 (1994).
9. See id. (besides siting disputes, significant disparities also have been noted in
"remedial action, location of clean-up efforts, and the quality of clean-up strategies").
10. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 850 ("[g]overnmental and non-governmental
organizations that currently dominate the process need to promote minority participation in the
dialogue and, even more fundamentally, they need to educate themselves about minority
concerns"); See Reich, supra note 4, at 278 ([m]inorities generally do not have entree to
decision making through environmental lobbying organizations").
11. See Carol M. Rose, EnvironmentalLessons, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1023, 1027 (1994)
("the newly emerging topic of environmental racism, now particularly in connection with
location of toxic or other wastes in low income areas"); Luke W. Cole, EnvironmentalJustice
Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523 (1994) ("[s]iting
disputes have been the primary context for environmental justice litigation"). But see Luke W.
Cole, Remedies for EnvironmentalRacism: A View from the Field, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1991,
1992 (1992) (posits that disproportionate burdens also exist regarding "air pollution, lead
poisoning, pesticide poisoning, and garbage dumps").
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environmental policy making, which makes it impossible to address each of
them within the narrow confines of a legal essay.
The purpose of this Article is to suggest a plausible approach for the fair
and efficient disposition of environmental justice problems arising from the
siting of waste facilities in poor and minority communities. Too often, the
academic discourse in this area has been largely theoretical and abstract, and
thus has been excoriated for lacking a consistent, unified theme." Some
detractors have argued that this shortcoming significantly undermines the
environmental justice movement. 3 Furthermore, a few pundits contend that4
the movement primarily persists because of such vague, abstract theories.
Whatever the level of skepticism, however, environmental justice remains a
vibrant force on the American environmental landscape. Regardless of its
harshest critics, it will not disappear from the scene.
The proof of this ascendancy is demonstrated not only by the rapidly
growing body of academic scholarship now devoted to environmental
justice," but also the currency the subject has gained in governmental
regulatory arenas-both legislative and administrative."6 Indicating, for
12. See Crawford, supra note 6, at 273 ("the legal literature remains highly theoretical").
As a practical matter, vagueness may advantageous, as "[c]oncreteness only leads to problem
after problem after problem"); Been, supra note 7, at 1085.
13. See Dr. Michael S. Greve, EnvironmentalJustice or PoliticalOpportunism?,9 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 475 (1994) (where the commentator criticizes the environmental
justice movement and seriously questions it major premises). See also Been, supranote 7, at
1006 (where the commentator theorizes that the environmental justice movement is now
presented in a manner that calls into question "the validity and feasibility of calls for fair
siting").
14. See Been, supra note 7, at 1006 (insinuates that environmental justice advocates have
cloaked "justice," "equity," and "fairness" within a shroud of vagueness simply to advance their
agenda).
15. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, EnvironmentalJusticeandDiscriminatorySiting: RiskBasedRepresentationandEquitableCompensation,56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329 (1995). See Luke W.
Cole, Foreword: A Jeremiadon EnvironmentalJustice and the Law, 14 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 9
(1995); John R. Kyte, Environmental Justice: The Need for Equal Enforcement and Sound
Science, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. AND POL'Y 253 (1994).
16. See Blank, supra note 6, at 1116-28 (where the commentator analyzes the pertinent
provisions of the Environmental Justice Act of 1992, which was co-sponsored by then-Senator
Al Gore and Congressman John Lewis. The Act did not pass either the House or the Senate in
1992; it was reintroduced in 1993, and, to date, has not successfully navigated the rigors of the
legislative process. Perhaps this can be described as "harmless error," given that its provisions
mirror the "toothless" features of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)). See Blank,
supranote 6 at 1121. Interestingly, the comment writer does propose federal legislation as a
prophylactic to environmental injustice, notwithstanding the flaws of the Environmental Justice
Act. See Blank, supra note 6 at 1136. On the administrative side, EPA Administrator Carol
Browner has stated "that she would like to increase citizen involvement, starting with Superfund
toxic cleanup projects in poor and minority communities and lead removal in low-income
areas." See Blank, supranote 6 at 1134 (citing Rita Beamish, PoorSay They Get 'Dumped' On,
DENVER POST, Dec. 20, 1993, at A5).
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example, the incipience of environmental justice as a federal policy is
President Clinton's Executive Order that requires federal agencies to consider
environmental justice concerns while performing their executive missions. 7
While the Executive Order could be assailed as a "paper tiger" substantively,
it does establish symbolically that the achievement of social equity in
environmental policy making is a matter of national importance.' 8 In fact, the
Executive Order may serve as a testament that "[flew environmental
movements have come so far so fast."' 9 Nonetheless, "[w]e need creative new
strategies that might actually work."" This Article will attempt to provide a
pathway to the resolution of this daunting task.
II.BACKGROUND

A.

The Philosophical Debate

Diverse views exists regarding "whether it is the initial siting decision or
subsequent events attributable to market dynamics that cause disparities
between the risks borne by whites and minorities, or by rich and poor."2 ' An
understanding of the precise basis for such disparity is crucial to ensure that
what remedies, if any, are appropriate in a particular situation.22

17. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994).
18. In Ironbound, New Jersey, for example, residents were able to block successfully the
conversion of a solid-waste transfer station into a $63 million sewage sludge treatment plant,
which the residents believed would spew noxious odors 24 hours a day, because of arguments
grounded on President Clinton's Executive Order. See IronboundDraws Its Line at the Dump,
N.Y. TIMEs, MaR. 29, 1997, at 22, § 1,col. I ("[w]hile the order applied only to federal
agencies and not to local and state governments, it has given communities 'a strong political
tool' to force debates over siting decisions," quoting Lois Gibbs, Executive Director of the
Citizens' Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste).
19. See Kyte, supra note 15, at 271.
20. See Cole, supranote 15, at 9. See also Crawford, supra note 6, at 273 (asserting "an
immediate, pressing need for strategies and tactics to both existing and threatened instances of
environmental injustice"); Torres, supra note 5, at 433 (very little commentary about how "to
achieve environmental justice"); Cole, supra note 11, at 1992 ("[]ore difficult than merely
identifying the problem is coming up with a solution to it").
21. See Mank, supra note 15, at 331. The commentator astutely observes that "it is
important to understand the causes of such disparities because different remedies may be
appropriate." See Mank, supra note 15, at 331.
22. See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
DisproportionateSiting or Market Dynamics, 103 YALE L.J. 138 (1994). The commentator's
basic thesis is that, without further research, we run the risk of devising remedies that
erroneously focus on race or class, to the exclusion of market dynamics, as the root cause of the
disproportionate siting problem. In such circumstances, there is, in the commentator's opinion,
the distinct possibility of crafting a remedy that may miss the mark.
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There have been varied critiques of the concept of environmental justice
on a number of levels.23 With regard to a "moral claim, the principal attack
is that there has not been a clear statement of the meaning of distributive
' In this connection, the
justice within the context of environmental burdens."24
basic premise is "that since there is no coherent definition of disproportionate
impact separate from the racial claims, assertions of such have to be rejected
until the causal link is indisputably proven or until a coherent case can be
made for the concept that unhinges it from the claims of racial injustice."2 5
With regard to a market perspective, the argument goes, "locally
undesirable land uses are attributable largely" to neutral, objective market
forces.26 Therefore, poor people, regardless of color, will be disadvantaged
invariably in relation to relatively wealthier people in the acquisition of goods.
And "[e]nvironmental quality," in the eyes of market adherents, "is merely a
good that also is market-sensitive."27' Thus, it is not surprising, under this
market-based point of view, that "[p]oor people merely choose, and rationally
so, to spend their scarce resources on other goods," namely, non-environmental goods.2"
Finally, with regard to a "coming to the nuisance" argument, a variation
of the market-based justification is, here again, advanced. The basic thesis is
that the environmental burdens currently railed against "pre-date the current
racial composition of the communities" in question.29 This, to be sure, raises
the question of whether waste sites moved to poor people, including poor
people of color, or whether poor people, including poor people of color,
moved to these sites pursuant to a normal, market-driven change in residential
housing patterns.3 0
23. See, e.g., David L. Feldman & Christopher H. Foreman, Jr., The Promiseand Perilof
EnvironmentalJustice,(The Brookings Institution 1998) 9 LAw & POLITICS BOOK REV. 66-68
(1999) (where the book reviewer, Feldman, notes that "Foreman, a senior fellow at the
Brookings Institution, posits that charges of disproportionate impact and 'discriminatory
regulatory enforcement' of environmental laws and regulations, while effective political
rhetoric, are 'weaker than environmental justice (EJ) advocates usually admit' due to a lack of
empirical evidence.").
24. See Gerald Torres, The Future ofEnvironmental Regulation: Environmental Justice:
The Legal Meaning of A Social Movement, 15 J. L. & COM. 597, 607 (1996).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 608.
30. See Torres, supra note 24, at 608. The commentator astutely observes that such
"choice might reflect a number of things. It might reflect the underlying land value and, because
we are in a market and class society, it makes sense that poor people live where land is cheaper.
However, the disparities might just reflect a desire to spend money on one thing rather than
another." Torres, supra note 24, at 608.
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The Constitutional Debate

It is generally understood that "[s]iting discrimination suits can address
only disparities caused by the initial decision."'" As a practical matter,
however, such suits don't usually succeed under the United States Constitution, given the United States Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause. In view of the Supreme Court's reasoning, only
conscious or willful conduct implicates equal protection concerns.32 As a
result, the Court has repeatedly required proof of "intent to discriminate" to
establish a constitutional violation.33 In the context of siting decisions, this
presents a virtually insuperable barrier for an aggrieved party. Consequently,
environmental justice claims based on the equal protection clause have been
invariably unsuccessful.34 This stark reality has sparked some legal scholars
to proclaim that the "battle for environmental justice may be better fought in
the political, rather than [the] judicial forum."35 In fact, a strong sentiment
exists that the judicial system is the worst venue to pursue environmental
justice claims.36 Not only must a claimant navigate daunting proof hurdles
31. See Mank, supra note 15, at331.
32. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977). In view of the constitutional "intent to discriminate" standard, the Equal Protection
Clause has not provided an optimal remedy for environmental justice claims. See, e.g., Bean
v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 782 F.2d
1038 (5th Cir. 1986); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning
& Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11 th Cir. 1989).
But see Omar Saleem, OvercomingEnvironmentalDiscrimination: The Need for a Disparate
Impact Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 211, 228-31 (1994) (where the commentator severely criticizes the "intent to
discriminate" criterion of the 14' Amendment in view of its historical genesis, namely, to shield
African-Americans from racial injustice). The antithesis frequently ensues whenever this
rigorous standard of proof is interposed in waste siting cases. Thus, the commentator advocates
the discredited "effects" test for such siting cases because, as in many employment
discrimination cases under Title VII, "claimants generally cannot obtain proof of wrongful
intent." See id. at 231.
33. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977).
34. See, e.g., Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.
Tex. 1979), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v.
Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 706 F.Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd,
896 F.2d 1264 (1llth Cir. 1989).
35. See Torres, supra note 5, at 437. See also Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation,
supra note 11, at 523 ("[e]nvironmental justice struggles are at heart political and economic,
noi legal").
36. See Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism, supra note 11, at 1995. The
commentator endorses a political, grass-roots remedial approach. In this vein, he cogently
argues that victims of environmental racism are most vulnerable in a courtroom and should seek
judicial relief only as a last resort. See Cole, supra, note 11, at 1991-97.
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posed by the United States Constitution, but the judicial system may provide
a distinct advantage to many well-heeled defendants, who might be better able
to pursue costly, protracted, and emotionally debilitating litigation." Thus,
as a bit of irony, an environmental justice claimant probably is imprudent to
"focus on discrimination suits and judicial scrutiny of substantive results."3 8
III. THE PATH TO AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY
A.

Shunning the Courts

Because the existing environmental law regime basically ignores the
distributional unfairness of environmental protection, the courts are not a safe
haven for environmental justice claimants.39 To be sure, the micro-economic
theory's dismissive attitude for social fairness values, coupled with the
daunting proof barriers ofthe United States Constitution,40 create a formidable
hurdle for such claimants. Furthermore, given the high transaction costs
ordinarily associated with complex litigation,4 ' securing an efficient outcome
37. See Cole, supra note 11, at 1996.
38. Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism, supra note 11. Some promise, although
yet to be squarely addressed by the United States Supreme Court, may exist in a judicial
challenge bottomed on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Seifv. ChesterResidents
Concernedfor Quality Living, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), dismissed on mootness grounds,
118 S. Ct. 2296 (1998), some citizens of Chester, Pennsylvania, an economically depressed and
predominately African-American town, brought suit in federal district court, contending that
Title VI afforded a private right of action to block decisions by an activity receiving federal
financial assistance to site waste treatment facilities repeatedly in Chester rather than in the rest
of Delaware County (Pennsylvania), which is mostly white. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit ultimately reversed the rejection of the plaintiffs' suit by the federal trial
court and, in turn, held that such a private environmental justice cause of action did come within
the purview of Title VI. But the permit for the challenged waste site was revoked by the Title
VI activity after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari, and Self, as a result, was dismissed
on mootness grounds. The Seifdecision "brought the 3rd Circuit into step with the majority of
federal appeals courts." See Steven Keeva, Pursuing the Right to Breathe Easy, A.B.A.
JouRNAL Feb. 1999, at 49. As a caveat, however, the commentator noted that "[I]uckily for
environmental justice advocates who feared the Court took the case to reverse the 3rd Circuit,
something happened on the way to the courthouse." Id. See also Bradford C. Mank,
EnvironmentalJustice and Title VI: Making RecipientAgencies Justify TheirSiting Decisions,
73 TuLANE L. REv. 787 (1999).

39. See Michael O'Neill, Law and Economics Needs a Dose of Reality, THE NAT'L L.J.,
July 15, 1996, at A14. Perhaps this reflects "the desiccated [sic], abstract character of Chicagostyle economics and its seeming indifference to history and present reality." Id.
40. See supra notes 31-38.
41. Transaction costs are defined as those costs necessary to effectuate a market exchange.
Such costs typically are search costs, enforcement costs, policing costs, and monitoring costs,
etc. Under Ronald. H. Coase's thesis, there is a direct correlation between the level of
transaction costs and the ability to obtain an efficient outcome. See Ronald H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 15-19 (1960).
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by way of litigation is extremely difficult."2 Hence, the judiciary should be
eschewed generally as a venue for the disposition of environmental justice
claims.
B.

Avoiding the EPA

The most contentious issue within the administrative realm lies With the
implementation ofEPA's interim guidelines for processing citizen complaints
that pollution permits issued by state and local agencies have discriminatory
effects and thus violate Title VI, which forbids state and local agencies that
get federal funding from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national
origin."3 Several governors, state and local government officials, and the U.S.
Conference of Mayors have adopted resolutions imploring EPA "to withdraw
its controversial interim guidance,""so as to avoid impeding the economic
development of those urban areas that sorely need it, namely, poor and
minority communities.45 "In response to these concerns, EPA has already
convened a new advisory committee. That group, composed of state and local

42. See Robert B. Reich, Regulation Is Out, LitigationIs In, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1999,
at 15A ("[r]egulating U.S. industry through lawsuits isn't the most efficient way of doing the
job").
43. See Cheryl Hogue, EPA Issues: GuidelinesforInvestigating Claimsthat State, Local
PermitsAre Discriminatory,66 U.S.L.W. 2504 (1998).
44. See Susan Bruninga, Western GovernorsAssociation JoinsCallsforEPA to Withdraw
Civil Rights Guidance, 67 U.S.L.W. 2024 (1998).
45. This dilemma---trading ecological health for economic gains-creates some profound
philosophical questions. To be sure, some commentators earnestly contend that it might be
morally repugnant to place poor or minority people in a position where they must choose
between their health and a cash bounty. See, e.g., Mank, supra note 15, at 357. A prime
example of such a dilemma is the "environmental racism" case arising from the proposed
construction of a polyvinyl chloride plant in the predominantly African-American town of
Convent, Louisiana, which is located in the midst of what is popularly known as "the chemical
corridor" between Baton Rouge and New Orleans. On two separate occasions, EPA
Administrator Carol Browner, trying to adhere to the letter and the spirit of President Clinton's
Executive Order, denied the owners of the proposed plant an air permit, which effectively
forestalled its construction. The fallout surrounding this decision was thunderous within
Convent (gender divisions generally developed within individual households over the prospect
of gaining $45,000 per yearjobs versus the environmental health of the town's children), within
the political hierarchy of Louisiana, including the Governor and the Louisiana Supreme Court,
and the Tulane University Law School, which opposed the construction of the polyvinyl
chloride plant. In the wake of this political imbroglio, the Louisiana Supreme Court "issued an
order prohibiting law student clinic representation of environmental and other community
organizations (unless the organizations are composed of indigents)." Letter from Professor
Oliver A. Houck, Tulane Law School, to Professor 0. Fred Harris, Jr., University of Illinois
College of Law (July 31, 1998). In a similar vein, see DAN MCGOvERN, THE CAMPo INDIAN
LANDFILL WAR (1995), where the Campo Indians passionately fought for the right to site a
commercial landfill on their reservation because of the economic benefits of the enterprise.
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environmental regulators, environmental justice advocates, academics, and
representatives of business, is to give recommendations to [EPA Administrator] Browner in December [1998]."'
In a later development, however,
"[a]fter a year of turmoil, the Environmental Protection Agency is going back
to the drawing board with its controversial effort to protect minorities from
excessive pollution. 4 7 The EPA announced that a new policy for dealing with
Title VI pollution permits in connection with the environmental justice
program "would be written by summer [1999], this time through an open
process of hearings, comments, and committee meetings.""8 However,
"[c]ritics of the program, while encouraged by the EPA's willingness to make
changes, are still concerned about the program's impact on economic
development." 9
In view of the overall disaffection and uncertainty surrounding EPA's
environmental justice policy, to date, under Title VI, future administrative
action by EPA-interim or final-does not provide much solace regarding the
fair and efficient disposition of environmental justice claims. Thus, an
environmental justice claimant should not look to EPA as a feasible source of
relief.
C.

An Extrajudicial/Extra-Administrative Remedy Is the Best Policy

In view of the myriad shortcomings of the judicial and administrative
processes in dealing effectively with environmental justice concerns, this
essay rejects both regimes in favor of a remedial scheme that promotes
cooperation, not litigation, along with the political empowerment of those who
disproportionately bear the burdens of environmental hazards-poor and
minority communities.5"
With regard to cooperation as the most prudent method of resolving
environmental justice claims, one can draw from the professional experiences
of lawyers, who deal routinely in practice with problems regarding environ46. Bruninga, supra note 44, at 2024.
47. EPA RevisitsIssue ofMinorities,Pollution,ST.LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 20, 1998,
at B7.
48. See id Ann Goode, the director of the EPA's Office of Civil Rights, was quick to
emphasize the agency "is not backing away from a strong program of environmental justice."
See id.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Stephanie B. Goldberg, Let's Make a Deal: Cooperatio, Not LitigationIs
the Newest Way to Clean Up Urban Wastelands, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1997, at 42. To be sure, it

doesn't take a rocket scientist to appreciate that in any form of litigation involving the exposure
to toxic or environmental hazards, settlement generally is the best policy. See 0. Fred Harris,
Jr., Toxic Substance Litigation: Is Settlement the BetterPolicy?,THE CHRONICLE, Spring 1990,
at 6.
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mentally hazardous conditions both in the public environmental law area 5 and
private toxic tort litigation." One of the most celebrated is Jan Schlictmann,
whose experiences in litigating the Woburn, Massachusetts, toxic torts case
served as the basis for the classic book (and now movie) A Civil Action.5"
After suffering through a traumatic experience where he lost his law firm, his
legal career, and his material possessions because of his obsession with one
of the seminal toxic torts cases, Schlictmann has returned to practice, is now
happily married, and, in addition, has joined the ranks of fatherhood; as a
result, he frequently offers the sagacious advice that "litigation all too often
is not conducive to problem-solving"54 in environmental cases. In this
connection, some form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is wont to
offer a creative remedial paradigm in such cases.55
"One type of dispute resolution increasingly employed by government
and other groups to address environmental issues is the policy dialogue."56
"Policy dialogue" broadly refers to those "processes designed to facilitate
voluntary, interactive exchange among diverse interests for the purpose of
working towards consensus solutions to policy issues."" In allowing a faceto-face exchange of ideas in an open forum to promote consensus problemsolving, this alternate dispute resolution mechanism offers the prospect of
achieving an appropriate remedy for an environmental justice problem,

51. Some of the major public environmental statutes are the Federal Clean Water Act and
the Federal Clean Air Act, which deal with pollution control, and the Federal Superfund Law
or CERCLA and the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [RCRA], which deal
with waste management.
52. In contrast to the public environmental law regime, the private tort regulation of
environmental hazards seeks damages and, in some instances, injunctive relief, when damages
are an inadequate remedy. See GERALD W. BOSTON & M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF
ENviRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORTS: CASES, MATERtMS AND PROBLEMS 3-5 (1994).
53. See JONATHAN HARR, A Civn ACTION (1996).
54. Jan Schlictmann, Lawyer Promotes CooperationOver Lawsuits, USA TODAY, Feb.
4, 1999, at 15A.
55. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) comes in a variety of forms. The most common
variation seems to be mediation, which is a non-binding form of dispute resolution, and
arbitration, which is binding. Regardless, the general advantage of ADR is that it is less costly
and more expeditious. See Michelle Amber, Study Shows Most Fortune 1000 Companies Use
Alternate Dispute Resolution Processes,67 U.S.L.W. 2570 (1999) ("ADR is used mostly for

economic reasons"; further, it is used "to preserve relationships; protect confidentiality; and
avoid setting legal precedents").
56. Jocelyn Adkins, The PolicyDialogue:SearchingforEnvironmentalSolutions, ENVTL.
L., Summer-Fall 1998, at 13.
57. Id. Policy dialogue entails three distinct elements: Assessment; Dialogue, and
Implementation. See id A significant advantage ofthis three-phase approach in the politically
divisive environmental justice field is that it could negate the "historically prevalent zero-sum
(i.e. win/lose) attitudes with collaborative ones." Id.
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provided, of course, that adversely affected poor and minority communities
are empowered with the full panoply of participatory, political rights.58
But, as a practical matter, how do such marginalized citizens become
sufficiently empowered so that they are able to engage in face-to-face
discussions at arms length politically to reach a consensus on an environmental justice problem peculiarly affecting them? In other words, how can the
relevant poor and minority community move, so to speak, from underneath the
political table merely eating the crumbs to a place at the political table where
they may taste the filet mignon of environmental decision making? This form
of political empowerment, to be sure, has its genesis in a grass-roots,
community-based effort.59 Further, such empowerment properly values more
strongly the views of people who are geographically close to environmental
problems.'
IV. CONCLUSION

Like most environmental policy concerns, securing an appropriate
remedy in environmental justice cases has no single answer for all situations.
But the "policy dialogue" dispute resolution mechanism, while protecting the
rights of poor and minority communities to engage in a remedial dialogue with
other stakeholders of the community about a particular environmental justice
problem, should provide the path to a remedy that will hit the mark.

58. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 851 ("[t]he challenge of opening up existing fora to
minority involvement is substantial").
An indispensable element of such political

empowerment, however, is the full cooperation and support of mainstream environmental
groups, such as the Sierra Club, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Environmental
Defense Fund, which can provide political and economic capital to the environmental justice
movement, while expanding their respective memberships and thus enhancing their political
clout in the environmental policy making arena. See Lazarus, supranote 1, at 850-57. But see
Eileen Gauna, FederalEnvironmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the
Roadto EnvironmentalJustice,22 ECOLOGYL. Q. 1,22-23 (1995) (noting the past indifference
of such mainstream environmental justice concerns).
59. Here again, effective political empowerment hinges largely on a symbiotic relationship
between environmental justice advocates and mainstream environmental organizations. See
Lazarus, supra note 1.
60. See Robert R.M. Verchick, CriticalSpace Theory: Keeping Local Geography in
American andEuropeanLaw, 73 TuLANE L. REV. 739,772 (1999) ("the people who will suffer

the most from destructive sections will usually be those physically closest to the environmental
damage").

